Here in Financial Regulation Matters we have covered the concept of ‘capture’ from a number of different angles, including the audit , banking , and tobacco industries through to the concept of ‘ public private partnerships ’. Additionally, we have also looked at issues relating to money laundering , and economic crime more generally. It is for those reasons that the recent news that the British Government have put in place a number of plans to tackle the systemic issue of economic crime within the country – with London being consistently rated as one of the world’s leading economic crime ‘ hotspots ’ – is worth examining. Yet, rather than this being the headline, there is a glaring issue that the media have been quick to focus upon. The Independent ’s headline neatly sums up the story: “ Government criticised for giving banks key oversight role over fraud and money laundering ”. So, in this post we shall examine these developments and analyse the theory of ‘capture’ a little mor

There are two issues which are the focus for today’s post, and both have been covered on separate occasions before here in Financial Regulation Matters . In February we discussed how the stated aims of President Trump, namely to ‘ drain the swamp ’ with regards to lobbying influence in Washington, D.C., were immediately proven to be nothing more than lip-service with the introduction of an Executive Order that preserved the ability of Congressional and White-House Officials to lobby after their term has expired. Then, in June, we discussed how large investors and other financial organisations were beginning to develop a societally-focused approach to their business, which translated into a reduction in investment in companies that profit from providing social ills, like tobacco companies. In today’s post we will look at an article that was published in The Guardian that discusses the actualities of the lobbying environment since Trump took office, with particular attention paid t

This post is based on an element of a current work-in-progress article that seeks to ascertain the regulatory framework that may surround the Credit Rating Industry within the U.K. in the event of a ‘hard-Brexit’ – i.e. a situation whereby the U.K. would have to regulate the rating industry directly, after relying upon the EU and the European Securities and Markets Authority’s regulation of the rating agencies. One of the suggestions within that piece is whether a dedicated ‘Office’ within a regulatory body, akin to the ‘Office of Credit Rating’ that was set up by way of the Dodd-Frank Act in the U.S. (in response to the appalling conduct of the Big Three agencies – Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch), would be a suitable option for UK regulators. Whilst that can be debated, this post will look at whether that ideal of a specialised Office is even worth transplanting into the U.K. regulatory framework. Whilst there is still a long way to go before we even know the form in