Today the author attended the “Shareholder Engagement in the EU” Conference in the European Parliament building in Brussels, Belgium. The conference was developed as part of a massive research project funded and ‘hosted’ by Aarhus University, though it has spread across the continent. Whilst this post will not go into detail on every talk in the conference today, certain aspects of the talks will be used to discuss the overarching and extremely important issue of ‘shareholder engagement’. There were a number of influential contributors at today’s event so those not included in today’s post are only excluded for the purpose of brevity, and nothing else. The event was a fascinating event in that it brought together a really good mix of scholars who specialise in the area, as well as practitioners who are being affected by regulatory developments; the details of the event can be found here . The conference was concerned with a number of aspects relating to shareholder engagement, b

In today’s post, the focus will be on the so-called “Big Four” audit firms – PwC, KPMG, Deloitte, and E&Y – after details of the collapse of construction firm Carillion continue to have a significant effect. We will examine these calls to dismantle the long-standing oligopoly, but there will be a discussion about what these calls actually mean. This author has advanced the notion of a ‘divergence’ existing when it comes to regulating oligopolies (specifically in relation to the Credit Rating industry), and it will be discussed whether this is the case in this particular instance also. There will also be some reference to a forthcoming book by this author on this very topic. The calls for the dismantling of the audit oligopoly could stem from a number of instances in reality, but the current calls stem from the collapse of Carillion. We have covered this collapse here in Financial Regulation Matters since the first warning-signs were uttered, but the revelations regardin

For months we have been discussing the impending fine that RBS was facing from the US DoJ with regards to their behaviour in the lead-up to the Financial Crisis, and today RBS learned its fate. In this third and final brief post today, we shall look at the details of that fine and examine both the sentiment it creates, and any potential effect it may have upon RBS as it continues its attempt to drag itself from a scandal-ridden decade. The issue of RBS being fined by the DoJ has been on the table for quite some time, with a number of elements coming in to play as RBS and investors struggled to predict the outcome. We spoke recently about how even the British government had inserted itself into the dynamic (lest we forget, the UK Government is the majority shareholder in the bank), and it seems that for all parties concerned, apart from the victims and the public of course, today’s announcement will be being toasted in the offices of the bank (and likely the Government) at the ti

This very brief post reacts to the news that Andrew Tyrie has taken control of the Competition and Markets Authority. In a previous post where were reviewed Tyrie’s work as head of the Treasury Select Committee, we asked where would Tyrie go next and what impact will he have? Now we know, it would be good to provide a brief review of his new endeavour and examine the importance of his appointment. As stated above, we asked in a previous post where would Tyrie go after he left the Treasury Select Committee . Last month we received our answer when it was announced that he would be taking over the lead of the Competition and Markets Authority , the UK’s leading competition regulator. In taking over, Tyrie announced that, in his belief, ‘ competition can and should be put even closer to the centre of British economic life, reaching every sector, rooting out monopoly and unfair trading practices, and enhancing Britain’s global competitiveness ’. The Guardian raises the point that Ty

This first of three brief posts today looks at a subject we have covered here in Financial Regulation Matters a number of times, and that is the concept of a financial whistle-blower. The story we have covered most is the story of Jes Staley, the CEO of Barclays ( here and here ), but although that case resulted in a (relatively) small fine, news recently suggests that the protections afforded to financial whistle-blowers need to be strengthened much more, both in light of the recent actions of leading members of the financial services but also because of the period that we are in – making sure transgressions in the financial sector are identified and expressed (either publically or to regulators) is crucial as we move away from the last financial crisis. There are a number of issues affecting Lloyds at the moment, but most stem from their takeover of HBoS and the fraud that was uncovered within a division in Reading. We have covered this story a number of times ( here ), but

In this brief post, the focus will be on updating the stories we have covered in the past here in Financial Regulation Matters regarding Wells Fargo and their performance over the past decade or so. The last time we covered the scandal that has blighted Wells Fargo’s progression was in May of last year, and since then there have been a number of developments. However, very recently, the bank has received a number of fines which demonstrate the failures that have left the bank struggling to regain the trust it needs to move forward. We last looked at Wells Fargo this time last year, and in that post we looked at the actions of a bank who fraudulently created between 2 and 3.5 million fake bank accounts for the purposes of selling services to customers who often were not aware of the actions taken on their behalf. We covered the details of the fraud in those previous posts, so today it is worth looking at the legal reaction to that fraud. We begin at the end of last month when t

In today’s post, the focus will be on a recently accepted article produced by this author. The article, which is concerned with examining a particular aspect of the post-Crisis regulatory approach to affecting the industrial structure of the ratings industry, has recently been accepted by the International Company and Commercial Law Review . This author has examined this particular aspect of the U.S. response to the Crisis before in a previous article , but from a different perspective; in this article, the emphasis is upon using the time that has passed since the establishment of the provision to examine whether it has had any effect and, if not then why not. The provision in question is a very small section of the Dodd-Frank Act 2010 , and whilst the section covers a few aspects the article is concerned with the attempt to encourage competition within this particular sector. The multiple aspects can be best classified as the ‘ Rule 17g-5 Program ’ and it was the Dodd-Frank Act

Owing to the dynamics of the academic year, there has been somewhat of a lull recently here in Financial Regulation Matters , so to get up to speed a round-up of developments within the banking sector seems like a good place to start. There have been a number of developments since the last post, so today we will work our way through them as efficiently as possible; the underlying sentiment is that the developments portray a sector that is consistently changing since the Crisis, with a number of aspects of that said Crisis continuing to play out (rather unsurprisingly). We start with our old friends RBS, who have taken up a large amount of space in Financial Regulation Matters , mostly on account of their remarkable development since the Crisis. Past posts have focused on the unique relationship that continues between the bank and the government (on account of its ownership of the bank), its terrible performance (alongside the FCA) in relation to its treatment of SMEs , and also