The Securities Association of China Piles Even More Pressure on Chinese CRAs
As an update to the last post here in Financial Regulation Matters that examined the pressure being piled onto the Chinese rating agencies by the state apparatus, today’s short post looks at further pressure coming from the ‘private’ sector within the Country.
Yesterday, the Securities Association of China (website
available here in Chinese and here in English) – a private, non-profit
organisation that was formed in 1991 and is under the ‘direction’ of the China
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) – produced its quarterly report and the
content was damning for the domestic credit rating agencies. We have already
discussed how the State is turning on the domestic industry in reaction to the widespread
issues facing issuers in the country, with a number of high-profile defaults
hitting the headlines. The report discusses
the apparent deficiencies within the agencies, ranging from ‘insufficient
disclosure’ to ‘weak inspection’ mechanisms, which it argues negatively affects
the quality of the underlying ratings. Furthermore, it is alleged by the report
that internal failings led to instances of missing records and loose archival
management, in addition to ‘unclear standards for follow-up ratings’ and, more
importantly, mismatches between rating models and rating decisions. It notes
that 14 of the 23 newly defaulting issues in 2020 did not receive any negative
adjustments to their ratings prior to the default becoming apparent.
There are a number
of estimations that suggest the corporate arena within China will
experience many more defaults this year, with previous
negative estimations from the international rating agencies coming to fruition.
This is causing
concern in different countries as the world’s largest investors potentially
face the consequences for corporate defaults within the Chinese territories,
with American
firms being highlighted as being particularly in danger. Obviously China
has responded by warning
that the stimulus packages within the US for companies will fuel asset bubbles
that will cause global issues. Nevertheless, it is almost predictable that
the State apparatus, and now the seemingly private sector, have laid the blame
for this at the door of the domestic rating agencies. Whilst they do deserve
the criticism, it should not be for the elements highlighted by the SAC’s
report; it should be for being an economic mouthpiece, not for the alleged
issues. Those issues are part and parcel for an industry that has to toe the
party line; they are not representative, necessarily, of the wider credit
rating model (at least to the extent that the domestic rating industry has
fallen foul!) One wonders, however, what the systemic effects of this will be.
If the market is forced to use market indicators of creditworthiness, the blame
for failures (which will happen) will have to be directed at the market; what
does that mean for the Chinese model of ‘capitalism
with Chinese characteristics’? For the domestic credit rating industry,
they are being systematically dismembered by the State, which indicates it does
not have a strong future. But, if the approach of market-based indicators does
not work, which it likely will not, then the International agencies should
not be willing to take its place in theory, as they will not be able to
become a mouthpiece for the State like the domestic agencies have. However,
that is not to say that definitely will not, because doing so would be a.
lucrative and b. could potentially fall under the ‘Chinese approach’ that the
international rating agencies have articulated they will be adopting for the
domestic market under the terms of their newly-acquired access. Would
international investors, regulators, and issuers stomach such a disregard for
impartiality if it were shown to be true? It is hard to tell, although my
experience and research suggests they would, because the rating agencies exist
to serve a practical and ideological purpose that does not rest on the concept
of true impartiality in reality, just in theory. With the relevant caveats, the
veneer of impartiality could still be retained by the international rating
agencies within China, even though the lucrative approach is to toe the party
line just the domestic agencies did. The one difference? The international agencies
are unlikely to suffer the same consequences.
The future for Chinese domestic credit ratings is an
interesting one that deserves attention.
Keywords – China, defaults, issuers, securities, @finregmatters
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