The SEC is Pushed to take a Stronger Approach to Credit Rating Reporting


On March 11th, the Investor Advisory Committee within the SEC discussed the issue of reporting problems within the SEC’s reporting framework for credit rating agencies. The discussion – found here in the SEC’s webcast archive – was based on the analysis of the Market Structure Subcommittee (list of sub-committee members found here) and the proposal regarding how the SEC should mandate the annual reporting of credit rating agencies and how they are assessed by the Commission.

 

Essentially, the issue relates to the annual report that the SEC must develop as part of wider regulations. This report must detail any rule infractions that SEC Examiners found, alongside a number of other elements (like the market share and concentration within the industry etc.) This process is replicated in the E.U. via ESMA, and in the U.S. this is conducted through the post-Dodd Frank developed ‘Office for Credit Ratings’ (OCR). The sub-Committee’s Chair, J.W. Verret, explained in the webcast (starting exactly 15 minutes from the end of the webcast) that the SEC allow for anonymity in their reports, something which is not mandated by wider statutes. For example, the SEC may state, in their annual report, that ‘a large credit rating agency’ or ‘a small credit rating agency’ did this or did that. The problem is, as Verrett explains, there are a number of instances whereby certain credit rating agencies are falling foul of the rules, and those same rating agencies are not, necessarily, seeking to alleviate those issues. Furthermore, the public then do not get to know which credit rating agencies are falling foul of the rules as examined by the SEC, and then what happens next.

 

The proposal is that the OCR take the same approach as the PCAOB which allows for the identification of its subjects during the examination phase. A warning was put forward regarding a potential disproportionate effect of de-anonymisation on smaller credit rating agencies, but the sub-Committee found that this was unlikely to be a problem. The webcast moved forward to hear from Mina Nguyen, another member of the sub-Committee, who suggested a number of important elements (unfortunately many of which are long-standing issues) need to be considered more by the SEC, like the relevance of qualitative and subjective analysis, the impact of ancillary services (which my PhD thesis and first book extensively covered) and other important elements.

 

The switch to de-anonymising the annual report could be an important one, but with important limitations. It will reveal the progress made by certain agencies with regards to compliance. It will also shine a light on the SEC’s enforcement of the rules, and their approach taken to regulating this important industry. However, it will not be backdated (unless I am mistaken), so any trends will only be revealed moving forward, and this in itself may change the behaviour of both the agencies and the regulator. Also, there will likely be no change in what the impact may be on the agencies for non-compliance, because as we well know in this blog, the agencies are not suspectable to the reputational capital theory that many have suggested. However, it will be an interesting addition to the analysis of the credit rating industry nonetheless.

 

Keywords – SEC, regulation, Annual Report, @finregmatters

Comments

Popular posts from this blog

Lloyds Bank and the PPI Scandal: The Premature ‘Out of the Woods’ Rhetoric

The Analytical Credit Rating Agency: A New Entrant That Will Further Enhance Russia’s Isolation

The Case of Purdue Pharma, the Sackler Family, and the Opioid Crisis