The SEC is Pushed to take a Stronger Approach to Credit Rating Reporting
On March 11th, the Investor Advisory Committee within the SEC discussed the issue of reporting problems within the SEC’s reporting framework for credit rating agencies. The discussion – found here in the SEC’s webcast archive – was based on the analysis of the Market Structure Subcommittee (list of sub-committee members found here) and the proposal regarding how the SEC should mandate the annual reporting of credit rating agencies and how they are assessed by the Commission.
Essentially, the issue relates to the annual report that the
SEC must develop as part of wider regulations. This report must detail any rule
infractions that SEC Examiners found, alongside a number of other elements
(like the market share and concentration within the industry etc.) This process
is replicated in the E.U. via ESMA, and in the U.S. this is conducted through
the post-Dodd Frank developed ‘Office for Credit Ratings’ (OCR). The
sub-Committee’s Chair, J.W. Verret, explained in the webcast (starting exactly
15 minutes from the end of the webcast) that the SEC allow for anonymity in
their reports, something which is not mandated by wider statutes. For example,
the SEC may state, in their annual report, that ‘a large credit rating agency’
or ‘a small credit rating agency’ did this or did that. The problem is, as
Verrett explains, there are a number of instances whereby certain credit rating
agencies are falling foul of the rules, and those same rating agencies are not,
necessarily, seeking to alleviate those issues. Furthermore, the public then do
not get to know which credit rating agencies are falling foul of the rules as
examined by the SEC, and then what happens next.
The proposal is that the OCR take the same approach as the
PCAOB which allows for the identification of its subjects during the
examination phase. A warning was put forward regarding a potential disproportionate
effect of de-anonymisation on smaller credit rating agencies, but the
sub-Committee found that this was unlikely to be a problem. The webcast moved
forward to hear from Mina Nguyen, another member of the sub-Committee, who
suggested a number of important elements (unfortunately many of which are
long-standing issues) need to be considered more by the SEC, like the relevance
of qualitative and subjective analysis, the impact of ancillary services (which
my PhD thesis and first
book extensively covered) and other important elements.
The switch to de-anonymising the annual report could be an
important one, but with important limitations. It will reveal the progress made
by certain agencies with regards to compliance. It will also shine a light on
the SEC’s enforcement of the rules, and their approach taken to regulating this
important industry. However, it will not be backdated (unless I am mistaken),
so any trends will only be revealed moving forward, and this in itself may
change the behaviour of both the agencies and the regulator. Also, there will
likely be no change in what the impact may be on the agencies for
non-compliance, because as we well know in this blog, the agencies are not
suspectable to the reputational capital theory that many have suggested.
However, it will be an interesting addition to the analysis of the credit
rating industry nonetheless.
Keywords – SEC, regulation, Annual Report, @finregmatters
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